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Abstract 
In ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller make the 
bold claim that killing in itself is not wrong, what is wrong is totally-disabling. 
In ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ Giubilini and Minerva 
argue for allowing infanticide. Both papers challenge the stigma commonly 
associated with killing, and emphasize that killing is not wrong at some margins 
of life. In this paper, we first generalize the above claims to the thesis that there 
is nothing morally wrong with killing per se, so long as it is instant and 
unannounced. Then, from the perspective of social evolution, we explain why 
people refrain from killing others, the general guideline being that it is 
unadvisable to kill someone with whom you associate a Second Person 
Perspective (SPP). Finally, drawing from a seminal paper of Press and Dyson on 
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we stress that an SPP without an SP (Second 
Person), or the other way around, can both lead to unwelcome results. 
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The Ethics of Killing, an Amoral Enquiry 
 
Cheng-Chih Tsai 
1. The Ethics of Killing 
In 2002, McMahan lured us away from the Old Testament paradigm 
‘Thou shalt not kill’, to seriously consider the Ethics of Killing at the 
margins of life, raising issues such as, at one end, abortion, and, at the 
other, euthanasia. Ten years later, we witnessed two further attempts to 
shift the frontiers of acceptable killings away from the two ends — that 
is, at the beginning and near the end — of life. 
On the one hand, in Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013) the 
authors ask the general question ‘What makes killing wrong?’ and claim 
that modern medicine has made it possible for us to distinguish between 
killing and totally-disabling, and that it is the latter rather than the former 
that harms a person. In effect, the authors suggested that the earliest 
possible time for killing a person legally can be much earlier than her 
natural death, and this allows doctors to procure vital organs from a 
totally-disabled, but not dead person, while her organs are still warm. 
On the other hand, Giubilini and Minerva (2013) tried to push the 
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latest acceptable time for killing a pre-person — as the authors may have 
said — further away from its conception. In particular, they claimed that 
just as in the case of abortion, people should be allowed to practice 
infanticide without giving any reason, so long as the infant is young 
enough. 
The grounds for these two claims are familiar accounts in the ethics 
of killing, namely, the non-person, the harm, and the deprivation theories. 
According to the non-person account, a fetus is not a person, so 
while killing a person is generally wrong, killing a fetus is not. Given 
that at the earliest stage of an infant, it is no more a person than a fetus is 
— the viability of an individual need not be dependent on where its 
position is relative to its mother’s womb — early stage infanticide is 
justified. Similar reasons sometimes are given for the legitimacy of 
killing someone in PVS — because it is no longer a person, but rather a 
living corpse. 
According to the harm account, killing is wrong because it harms 
the victim.  Given that a totally-disabled person is already “totally-
disabled”, there is nothing wrong with killing that person as he simply 
cannot be further harmed. Similar considerations can be applied to the 
killing of fetuses, embryos and zygotes, as they may not have developed 
a mental mechanism that allows them to feel the harm.1 
According to the deprivation account, killing is wrong because it 
deprives the victim a potential, a possible “future like ours”. So, 
                                                     
1 Can we harm an apple? Probably not. 
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naturally, the proponents of this theory might not want to accept the 
above mentioned argument for infanticide. They not only insist that the 
deprivation of the potential to become a person harms the individual but 
also maintain that the harm can be there even if the victim himself is not 
there to feel it, cf. Nagel (1979), Nozick (1981), and Feinberg (1984). 
However, as Giubilini and Minerva rightly put it, had a person not been 
conceived then no person is deprived of a potential to be a person — it is 
not a person at all. So, infanticide cannot be easily refuted by the 
deprivation theory. 
Before we go on to say more about the ethics of killing, let us pause 
for some thoughts on the truth condition of a death statement. According 
to the Fregean schema, ‘John is tall’ is true if the referent of ‘John’ lies in 
the denotation of ‘is tall’, and presumably ‘John is dead’ can be analyzed 
in the same way. But, if we look more closely at the evaluation of a 
token sentence of either of the two sentence types, we would find that 
the truth condition of it amounts to, rather, a sentence of the form ‘John’s 
x fails to meet the y-condition at t’ for some x, y and t. The case for the 
tallness of John can be easily prescribed in terms of his physical body, 
while for the case of death, some possible candidates for the x are (i) 
heart, (ii) brain stem, and (iii) cerebrum, and each of them can be given 
some practical criterion y. This is the simplest reading of a death 
statement, and I would term it the ‘Type-I’ reading of a death statement. 
Type-I death statement is easy to analyze because the referent of the 
subject is easy to be located, and it can either be conceived of as a 
temporal slice of a B-theoretical being or simply be conceived of as an 
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A-theoretical entity. In either case, the identity of the subject can be 
established physically. 
However, the tendency,2 in most countries, of trying to shift from 
(i) to (iii) in defining death reflects the fact that, when death is concerned, 
what we care most is whether the “mind” of the person is still around. 
Classical arguments for the essentiality of cognitive power for 
personhood can be found in Fletcher (1975) and Singer (1985). In sum, 
many people think that the subject of the sentence in question refers to 
something with cognitive power, and I shall call this approach the “Type 
II” reading. As I have hinted earlier, the Type I reading differs from the 
Type II reading in that the former is concerned with the physical identity 
of the subject, yet the latter is concerned with the personal identity of the 
subject. In particular when a person is dead in the Type II reading, it 
amount to asserting that a past person is no longer around rather than that 
a present person has the property of “being dead”. 
2. The Absence of the Victim 
According to the Type I reading, the killing of John amounts to the 
stopping of certain biological functions of John at a specific time. So, 
after the death of John, the referent of John is still around, and it can be 
identified with his corpse. In this sense, disregarding the complicated 
                                                     
2 It is only a tendency that I am talking about, and I by no means mean that some countries 
have already reached (iii). 
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social connections that might be related to John and the pain he might 
experience during the dying process, the killing of John is not much 
different from the killing of an animal, and my Mountain Goat Fantasy 
helps to illustrate that in this situation John cannot be the victim of the 
killing. 
The Mountain Goat Fantasy 
Jack is the only goat which lives on a mountain top and it has 
been in solitude, if that is the right word, for three years. Having 
no family, no friend and no spiritual faculty that allows it to 
communicate with God, this handsome goat just lives from day to 
day enjoying itself. One day, a hunter in ambush shot Jack dead 
with a magic bullet that instantly took its life. Given that Jack has 
experienced no panic beforehand, no pain during the dying process, 
which we assume to be under a nano-second, and no feeling 
whatsoever after its death, was Jack harmed by the hunter? 
Apparently, according to the Type I reading, Jack was not harmed. 
According to the Type II reading, it is even clearer that in the above 
case, there is no victim of death. It is as if Epicurus’ famous passage ‘If I 
am, death is not. If death is, I am not’ still echoes. On the one hand, the 
insight of Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013) that as far as harm is 
concerned, the dead are no more harmed than the totally-disabled, serves 
as a reminder for us that at some stage of one’s life there can be no harm 
done to it, because the person is already gone forever. On the other hand, 
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the insight of Giubilini and Minerva (2013) that if one can employ the 
non-person argument to support the practice of abortion, then by 
consistency there is no ground for banning infanticide also reminds us 
that at some stage of one’s life, early infancy say, there can be no harm 
done to it. 
The latter case, of course, is complicated by the Future-Like-Ours 
argument of Marquis (1989). However, an argument against killing a 
fetus based on a deprivation theory of this sort can be properly explained 
away in terms of the standard theory of reference in the same way that 
we would not say that J. F. Kennedy was deprived of his valuable future 
— Kennedy was what he was, and to talk about things that might happen 
otherwise is to talk about some other person.3 As a consequence, the no-
victim analysis can be illustrated by the following diagram, where the 
dotted lines indicate where killing should be unconditionally accepted, 
i.e. where there is no victim, while O, M, S, G, and T stand for the 
positions suggested in the Old Testament, McMahan (2002), Sinnott-
Armstrong and Miller (2013), Giubilini and Minerva (2013) and the 
sceptic of the present paper — which is characterized by the position that 
an instant-killing of someone while she is sleeping is doing no harm to 




                                                     
3 A careful analysis of the reference of a proper name would affirm the same. 
  









Evidently, if harm theory is accepted, then a competent adult is no 
more harmed than a totally-disabled individual is when he is killed, so 
long as we make sure that the process of killing is extremely quick and 
unexpected and that it is done while the victim is not in a conscious state 
— ending one’s life while asleep is a blessing. 
I will use my Penman Fantasy to further illustrate this thesis and to 
convince the reader that the no-victim argument works more naturally 
than he or she may have expected. 
The Penman Fantasy 
While I was in my study reading a book I found a strange passage in 
it which said ‘if you cast the following spell @2%$^@&^*3#&, 
then the pen in your hand will become a penman and talk to you for 
two minutes’. I casted the spell with doubt, but it turned out that the 
pen indeed became a penman and talked to me for two minutes. But 
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pen. I casted the spell again and again, and had altogether twenty 
minutes of conversation with the penman. But then I decided not to 
cast the spell any more. Have I deprived the pen or the penman a 
future? 
So, according to the deprivation theory, killing an adult instantly is not in 
itself wrong, because he has not been deprived of any future good, just as 
the penman was not deprived of any future enjoyable conversations with 
me when I decided not to bring him back to life any longer, or as a fetus 
or infant is not deprived of any future when it is aborted.  
In sum, we are guided by Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013) and 
Giubilini and Minerva (2013) to conclude that there is nothing wrong 
with killing an adult so long as we give the “victim” an unexpected, 
unpainful, unregistered instant kill, in short an u-killing. However, this 
conclusion is absurd. There must be something wrong here.  Have I 
committed the fallacy of Slippery Slope? I hope I have succeeded in 
convincing the reader that this is not the case. Or, does this absurd 
conclusion suggest that both of the two papers have failed to catch the 
key reason why citizens in a civilized human society generally refrain 
from killing each other, including the very ill and the very young? 
We need to find a new ground for explaining why we should refrain 
from killing an adult, and then, in effect, push the argument toward the 
two ends of life. In other words, we should go along the following 
directions. But how?  
 
  






3. The Golden Rule and Second Person Perspective 
Let me restate my position here: so far as the explanation of the 
wrongfulness of killing is concerned, the harm theory and the 
deprivation theory are both wrong-headed. They resort to the wrong 
items to explain the morality of killing, so as to allow us to push their 
arguments to the extreme and conclude that all u-killings are acceptable. 
This result is by no means surprising, as the notions of harm and 
deprivation can be applied to animals as well and surely we would not 
blame an insect for killing another. 
Evidently, the ethics of killing needs to be built on other grounds, 
and I propose an account with two key ingredients: 
1) The ground against human beings’ killing one another comes in 
two levels, the primitive level and the ideological level. The primitive 
level can be demonstrated with the fact that on learning that you are 
about to take her life, a human agent would normally fight for her life 
with no reserve; and the ideological level can be illustrated with the fact 
that in an idealized society, individuals refrain from killing one another 
so as to ensure that one does not have to worry about someone else 
murdering her while she falls asleep. As the primitive ground cannot 
T′ 
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solve the case of u-killing, it is clear that the true ground for not killing 
at will — or, in more familiar terms, the ground for granting others 
“right to life” — is, in essence, a social norm which comes from one’s 
idea of “doing to others as you would have them do to you.” As a result, 
we should not blame a lion for killing one of us because it does not have 
a mind sophisticated enough to appreciate and take part in our 
ideological social construction. 
2) A human being naturally cares for what lies ahead of him, so 
despite that death occurs to a person only when he is no longer around, 
the battle field concerning the rights or wrongs of killing normally 
remains at stages earlier than one’s death. An interesting fact to observe 
is that it is always the living that are discussing and evaluating the harms 
or deprivations that death may bring. It is also interesting to observe that 
one often projects his personal identity to a stage well before he can be 
characterized as a person, or well after he was totally disabled. As a 
consequence, whether I would grant a right to life — which is by all 
means a human construction — to certain stage of a person’s life hinges 
on whether I would consider the corresponding stage of mine as some 
stage of me that I would like others to respect and refrain from hurting. 
In this aspect, we can start extending the range of our no-killing zone 
back towards both ends of one’s life. 
In sum, a u-killing itself neither harms the “victim”, nor deprives 
any future good from him, but the worry of a person concerning the 
possibility of his “premature” death does harm him. The Golden Rule 
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prevents us from killing others in our community because we do not 
want to live with such worries. As to who, or what, counts as another 
person, Second Person Perspective (SPP) is a sure guide — our no-
killing zone does not cover cases in which no SPP is involved. For 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller, the totally-disabled are not associated 
with an SPP, and for Giubilini and Minerva, fetus and new born babies 
alike are not associated with an SPP, so we are not to be blamed for u-
killing them. 
So, according to the present account, what matters in the ethics of 
killing is whether we have killed someone to whom we associate with an 
SPP. Nevertheless, SPP is, after all, a mental construction rather than 
something more concrete, such as a second person (SP). Different people 
may have different attitudes toward a new born baby, or a totally-
disabled man. For some, these individuals are persons like us, having 
perspectives similar to ours concerning their wishes to live, but for 
others, such SPP’s are at best projected to these non-persons. In extreme 
cases, someone might even prescribe no SPP to a normal adult, because 
he does not see the latter “inferior” person as a person. However, we 
shall not return to this problem until near the end of this paper. 
Second Person Perspective in IPD games 
Social evolution is a candidate theory for human morality, in 
general, and human cooperation, in particular, as illustrated in Maynard 
Smith and Price (1973) and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). The good, 
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altruistic, or cooperative behaviors may turn out to be just what selection 
favors, rather than driven by moral imperatives. In particular, even if on 
a one-off basis it seems rational to cheat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,4 on 
a long-term basis, one’s expected fitness generally depends the behaviors 
of others. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) has revealed that kinship and 
probability of re-encountering are two key factors that shape the 
evolution of a population, and this suggests that so far as the effect of an 
act of killing is concerned, one should not merely care about the harm or 
deprivation that the act would bring to the victim, if any, but also 
consider the effect that the society as a whole may have upon the killer 
himself due to the fact that both the victim and the killer are nothing but 
two members/players of the same society/game. 
To the author’s knowledge, the most vivid demonstration of how 
essential an SPP can be in determining the outcome of an IPD game is to 
be found in Press and Dyson (2012). It is shown therein that in the two–
player IPD (Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma) game, there exists a ZD (Zero-
Determinant) strategy for a player X to win over her evolutionary5 
opponent Y, who, without a theory of mind about X, can only accede to 
X’s extortion. While most people are impressed by the existence of the 
ZD strategy, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to another 
equally important thesis — which is much more relevant to the topic of 
                                                     
4 The author does not endorse this observation, but the present paper is no place to elaborate 
on this issue. 
5 As Karl Sigmund and Martin Nowak rightly pointed out, on http://www.edge.org, the term 
“evolutionary” is inappropriate as Y only adapts but not evolves. 
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the present paper — namely, a theory of mind, or, equivalently, an SPP, 
can play an essential role in disarming the ZD strategy. 
According to Press and Dyson, once Y has developed a theory of 
mind about his opponent X, the ZD strategy of X may fail to take any 
advantage of him. The lesson to be learned here is subtle in the sense that 
although “having a mind” plays a role in IPD, what truly makes the 
difference is “having a theory of mine” for the opponent.  In other 
words, what matters more is a second person perspective rather than 
merely a first person perspective. 
Let us now look more closely at how an SPP, or a “theory of mind” 
in Press and Dyson’s terms, can affect the result of an IPD game that 
involves a ZD strategy. If X alone is witting of ZD strategies, then the 
outcome of the IPD depends on whether Y has a theory of mind. In 
particular,6 
if Y has a theory of mind, then IPD is simply an ultimatum game, 
where X proposes an unfair division and Y can either accept or 
reject the proposal. If he does not (or if, equivalently, X has fixed 
her strategy and then gone to lunch), then the game is dilemma-free 
for Y. He can maximize his own score only by giving X even more; 
there is no benefit to him in defecting. 
The latter Y is an evolutionary player who, according to Press and Dyson, 
is arbitrarily good at exploring a fitness landscape, but sadly this feature 
                                                     
6 Press and Dyson (2012), p. 10412. 
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makes him an easy prey of his extorting opponent. 
Now, while an evolutionary Y who has not developed an SPP is 
guided by his instinct to optimize his gain and thus falls prey of his 
opponent, a Y who has a theory of mind can conceive of the possibility 
that he can harm himself so as to threaten his opponent X, who, 
according to this Y, has a mind — and a theory of mind as well — and 
may reckon the adjustment of her original strategy desirable, because her 
opponent’s not abiding to her extortionate strategy (by harming himself 
in order to punish her) is threatening to lead her into a situation where 
she is rewarded with nothing comparable to what she might reasonably 
anticipate before she comes up with, and actually puts into practice, the 
ZD strategy. Furthermore, concerning whether X can go to lunch after 
setting down her strategy against an opponent, Press and Dyson have 
remarked that ‘if she imputes to Y a theory of mind about herself, then 
she should remain engaged and watch for evidence of Y’s refusing the 
ultimatum.’7 
In sum, SPP makes all the difference to whether the innovative ZD 
strategy would work for an X witting of it when she meets an opponent 
Y not witting of the strategy. Let me stress that there is a vital distinction 
between having a mind and having a theory of mind. The ability to 
conceive and abide by a particular strategy can be taken as the first step 
towards having a mind. Yet having a mind requires more. To be 
classified as with a mind, one is supposed to be capable of coping with 
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
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changes. But here, having a mind by itself still cannot deliver Y from his 
doomed fate. As Press and Dyson remarked, ‘If X plays a constant ZD 
strategy, then any strategy of Y’s, rapidly varying or not, turns out to be 
equivalent.’8 What matters is rather whether Y sees X as someone who 
can rightly conceive of his behaving badly so as to harm both parties as a 
threat, and, as a result, choose to lift her ZD strategy and invite Y to 
cooperate with her so that both can be better off. 
In a similar way, X’s having a mind does not in itself prompt her to 
make a change of her ZD strategy when she is faced with some persistent 
bad behavior of Y which seems to suggest that he is refusing the 
ultimatum. It is possible that X simply regards those bad behaviors as 
something coming from the intrinsic evolutionary drive hardwired into Y. 
Only when X adopts an SPP for Y can she realize that Y’s refusing the 
ultimatum has to be dealt with “personally” — leaving for lunch while 
playing with Y can turn out to be a disastrous decision that causes her a 
great loss, even if by so doing she can still guarantee that Y would not 
fare better than herself as far as scoring is concerned — because Y’s 
behavior has suggested to her that Y is not governed by a law of nature 
or an evolutionary (in the restricted sense of Press and Dyson) drive, but 
rather by a mind capable of envisaging new strategies some of which 
serve only as a tentative tool to force X to change her extortionate 
strategy. 
To sum up, for the ZD strategy of X to work on Y, both X and Y 
                                                     
8 Ibid. 
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need to have a mind (for Y, it is only in a minimalist sense). However, 
for that strategy to fail — as we would have anticipated it to happen for a 
real-life situation and is hinted in Stewart and Plotkin (2012) as well — 
both X and Y have to reckon that their opponents have a mind and a 
theory of mind as well. For Y, the functioning of X’s mind and SPP 
justifies his non-cooperative action. For X, the functioning of Y’s mind 
and SPP justifies her reaction to Y’s reluctance to cooperate. If we look 
more closely at this situation, we will find that, for the failure of X’s ZD 
strategy, Y not only need to assume that X has a mind, but also need to 
assume that X knows that he has a mind as well — as mentioned earlier, 
if X does not reckon that Y has an SPP, she might just go for lunch and 
leave the ZD strategy as it is in the first place. Similarly, X does not only 
assume that Y has a mind, she also assumes that Y assumes that she has 
a mind — as mentioned earlier, if Y knows that X does not have an SPP 
which can lead her to change her strategy, he would have accepted the 
ultimatum she proposes, and the apparent threat to harm both would then 
be explained away as merely part of an original evolutionary strategy. 
4. SPP without an SP or Vice Versa, Practical Issues 
We have seen that SPP plays a key role in our interaction with 
others. In particular, SPP may affect our decisions of whether to kill a 
totally-disabled patient and whether to kill an unwanted infant. However, 
as hinted in Press and Dyson (2012), having SSP without the presence of 
a second person can be costly for a player. We will now use the real-life 
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example considered in Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013) to illustrate 
this general fact. 
However, before we look at possible consequences of an SPP 
without an SP, I should mention an extremist position which eliminates 
personal identity altogether from the ontology, hence, in particular, the 
notion of second person becomes meaningless. In Tsai (2013), after 
examining three core issues in bioethics, a conclusion concerning 
personal identity is drawn, which echoes Parfit’s more general skeptical 
view on personal identity, cf. Parfit (1984). It is then suggested that, for 
pragmatic considerations, the roles previously played by personal 
identity be taken up by agency. However, we shall not get into this subtle 
and sophisticated matter here, and will simply assume, for most of the 
time, that we know what a person is. 
In Jan. 2012, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G. Miller’s 
paper entitled ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ was first published online 
in Journal of Medical Ethics, and it later appeared as Sinnott-Armstrong 
and Miller (2013). Comments from Bevins (2013), DeGrazia (2013), 
Driver (2013), and McMahan (2013) are subsequently included, with the 
authors’ reply to critics, Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013a) in the 
same issue as well. The main point of Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller 
(2013), as has been explained earlier, is that modern medical technology 
has made the distinction between killing and totally-disabling possible, 
and it happens that the wrongness we used to associate with killing 
might actually come from totally-disabling instead. 
Evidently, Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013) is more concerned 
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with a real life issue, namely the abandon of Dead Donor Rule (DDR) — 
proposed by Miller (2012), Veatch (2008), and Veatch (2010) etc.— than 
with the philosophical issues that we have been addressing here. For 
patients that do not meet the criteria of brain death, yet are apparently in 
a mindless state, or a “totally-disabled state” as defined in Sinnott-
Armstrong and Miller (2013), the current practice in the US is that, with 
the consent from the patient9 and/or her family, we remove the life-
sustaining device and wait until the patient’s heart meets the minimal 
requirement for it to be declared ‘irreversible’ and then the patient is 
pronounced dead based on the heart-lung failure criterion and her heart is 
procured and donated to some other patient. However, if the patient who 
receives the heart is up walking again, then the doctors amount to 
‘Reversing the Irreversible’, as Veatch quipped in Veatch (2008). 
Such miraculous deeds can indeed be demystified by simply 
observing that 
1) The death of an individual might neither imply nor be implied by 
the death of a heart. So the irreversibility of a man’s life is not captured 
by the irreversibility of his heart. Evidently, in Veatch’s case, the 
function of the heart itself is reversible while the life of its former owner 
is not; as to the new owner of the heart, her former heart is irreversible, 
yet her previously vulnerable life is reversible. 
2) Regardless of whether one can obtain a consistent criterion for 
the death of the organ donor, the aliveness of the individual by no means 
                                                     
9 In the form of advance directives, of course. 
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entails that he is still a person. This is quite consistent with the basic idea 
behind the brain-death definition of “death” that the healthy, living heart 
of a brain-dead patient can be procured without guilt. Similarly, a living 
brain incapable of facilitating the actions of a person can play little role 
in the context of social evolution. 
3) Total-disability does not involve any personal identity crisis 
which may arise from the swapping or the transplantation of hearts. 
What matters is the existence/non-existence of an agent capable of 
generating actions and reactions. The identity of the agent is at best a 
collective name for the action and reaction that the agent generates. 
So, as far as I can see, there is no intrinsic reason to stick to the 
DDR, and, as suggested in Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013), t-
disability — or more precisely, the absence of an SP — seems to be a 
good alternative criterion for vital organ procurement.10 However, the t-
disability of an individual, i.e. her ceasing to be a person, does not imply 
that other persons cannot see her as a person and treat her the way they 
would treat a person who is able to act and react. In other words, in the 
absence of a second person — both in the strong sense that there is no 
person in reality at all, or in the weak sense that the individual in 
question is not an agent — one’s adoption of an SPP definitely has some 
effects on how the species is to evolve. Apparently, frequent unnecessary 
fleeing for false alarms — or, analogously, ascribing an SPP to an X who 
                                                     
10 Here, it needs to be stressed that people in deep coma and patients with the locked-in 
syndrome do not meet the t-disability criterion. 
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has gone for lunch — may be more costly than we think. Furthermore, 
by spending extract money on maintaining the lives of t-disabled persons, 
we in effect reduce our chance of survival, both as an individual and as a 
species. 
Finally, let us all be warned that, SP without an SPP is, in general, 
far more dangerous than SPP without an SP. As a corollary of this 
warning, imagine a human society all of whose members associate no 
SPP to their infants — a society that Giubilini and Minerva might, or 
might not, want to endorse — and work out how it would evolve! 
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